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HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM
LIKE IN KELO?
DEBRA POGRUND STARK'

I. INTRODUCTION

In one of the most controversial decisions by the United
States Supreme Court in 2005,1 the majority of the Court in Kelo
v. City of New London2 ruled that the city of New London's
condemnation of certain private property to facilitate an economic
development plan for the city satisfied the "public use"
requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The combination of three factors alarmed the dissenting members
Debra Pogrund Stark is a professor of law at The John
Marshall Law
School. She thanks Steven Schuetz, Ph.D., candidate for the J.D. degree at
The John Marshall Law School, for his excellent research assistance, Dean
John Corkery for his support, Professor Kevin Hopkins for his encouragement
to write this article, and Professor James Durham for his helpful comments. I
also wish to thank former Dean Robert Johnston for first alerting me to the
more complicated facts surrounding the Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
decision and for his assistance in researching the facts behind this decision.
1. See, e.g., Eduardo M. Pen, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London:
Two Views of the Castle, 74 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2974 (2006). As Pen
reports:
The public reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's Kelo decision
permitting the exercise of eminent domain for economic development
was swift and virtually unanimous. Polling data collected in the weeks
following the decision measured public opposition to the decision at
approximately ninety percent. People are serious about protecting their
homes against eminent domain, and the broadly shared view of the
private home as a castle plays no small role in that phenomenon.
Id. See also, e.g., Randy J. Bates, II, What's the Use? The Court Takes a
Stance on the Public Use Doctrine in Kelo v. City of New London, 57 MERCER
L. REV. 689, 710-11 (2006) (showing intense disdain for the Kelo case by the
states and their legislatures and also finding that predictions of significant
implications of the Kelo case on the poor and less-fortunate are coming true
and will disproportionately affect them in the future). Moreover, the case does
little to help guide state courts in deciding future decisions until a future
takings case is decided because "[o]nce ... lawsuits arrive in a state court with
plaintiffs screaming 'impermissible takings,' the state courts, as Justice
O'Connor's dissent warns, will have no guidance from the Court on how to
conduct an inquiry into whether the taking is a permissible one or not.
Therefore, legal chaos may ensue in state courts until the Supreme Court
clarifies or overrules Kelo." Id. at 712 (footnotes omitted).
2. 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2669 (2005).
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of the Court to the point that they considered the case to be a
strong repudiation of property rights. First, the condemned land
would eventually be deeded to private entities that would make
uses of the property not generally open to the public.3 Second, the
purpose of the condemnation was not to prevent a "harmful" use of
property.' Third, in light of the deferential position the Court had
previously taken when ruling on whether a specific taking satisfies
the "public use" requirement, Justice O'Connor in her dissent5
concluded that following the Kelo decision, "[tihe specter of
condemnation hangs over all property."6 O'Connor argued that
under her reading of the majority's reasoning, any transfer of
property which leads to a more productive use of the property will
pass the public use test.' In addition to this assault on private
property rights, Justice O'Connor sounded an alarm over the
unjust possibility that, after Kelo, those private parties with fewer
resources are more likely to lose their property to private parties
with more resources.8 Justice Thomas, in a separate dissenting
opinion, raised this point in terms of its impact on AfricanAmericans and the elderly. 9 He pointed to statistics that show
that beginning in the 1950s, after the Berman case, ° cities which
have used their taking power to promote economic development
have done so in a manner that disproportionately impacts the
private property rights of African-Americans and the elderly."
This Article first addresses whether the dissent's and the
public's understanding of the case, that a city can now condemn
private property anytime the city plans to deed the property to
another private property owner who will have a more economically
productive use of the property, is a correct reading of the majority
opinion. The Article focuses on some of the dicta in Justice
Steven's majority opinion and in Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion to dispute this understanding of the case.
This Article then argues that the deferential approach
relating to the legislative judgment of public use taken by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Berman" and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff" cases, which the Court relied upon in the Kelo case, lacks

3. Id. at 2681-82.
4. Id. at 2676.
5. Id. at 2671 (joined by late Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia,
and Thomas).
6. Id. at 2676.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2677.
9. Id.at 2687.
10. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
11. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686-87.

12. 348 U.S. 26.
13. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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case law support in the context of "non-traditional" takings.14 The
Article scrutinizes each of the cases that the courts in Berman and
Midkiff cited to for support for extreme judicial deference to a
legislative judgment of public use and demonstrates that none of
the cases cited to in support for this dicta actually provide support
for applying such a deferential approach in the context of a "nontraditional taking." "
The Article then provides a close examination of the facts in
Midkiff as an example of the pitfalls with applying a deferential
approach to a legislative judgment on the issue of what is a public
use, especially in the context of a non-traditional taking. The
Article argues that if the Hawaii Housing Authority in Midkiff had
been required to provide evidence of the public benefit in that case,
the court would have discovered that the condemnations were not
actually achieving a benefit to the public through an end to
"oligopoly" as asserted by the governmental authority, but instead
benefiting wealthy tenants at the expense of charitable public
trust landlords.16
This Article then argues that with non-traditional takings
there is a greater likelihood of abuse of process than with
traditional takings and that courts should more closely scrutinize
such non-traditional takings. The Article points out that there
already exist two recent Supreme Court precedents for applying a
closer scrutiny of governmental actions that impinge upon
property rights (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 7 and
8
Dolan v. City of Tigard"
) when, due to the context of the
governmental action, the action is more susceptible to abuse. 9
The Article also argues that this closer scrutiny in the context of
any private-to-private transfer is a better way to protect the
fundamental right to security in one's private property, while at
the same time allowing governmental entities to engage in
14. See infra Part III.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
18. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
19. The U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan required that there be an "essential
nexus" between the alleged public interest asserted by the government and the
condition imposed on the property owner to obtain a permit because in this
context "there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective."
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 414 (requiring that the
city provide evidence of a rough proportionality between the exaction required
by the city and the projected impact of the property owner's planned
development requiring a permit). In both cases this higher level of scrutiny
came about because the court viewed the action to be more susceptible to
abuse in part because such actions are more "adjudicatory" in nature than
legislative and therefore owed less deference than in the context of a
comprehensive zoning ordinance. Id. at 391.
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important public benefit projects, than the "public harm"
limitation approach proposed by Justice O'Connor in her dissent.
The Article concludes that to restore the constitutional
system of checks and balances, the level of judicial scrutiny of the
public use requirement should depend upon the different contexts
of the taking, and articulates three different categories of takings
and the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny and legislative
burdens for each category. Under a category one taking (a
"traditional taking" where the government will own the land
taken, the land taken will be open to the public as a matter of
right, or certain specialized traditional takings)20 it will be
presumed that the taking satisfies the public use requirement, but
the presumption can be rebutted by evidence of bad faith, abuse of
process or pretext. Under a category two taking (a non-traditional
taking where a private party will own the land taken), the
government has the burden to prove with substantial evidence
that the public benefit is likely to occur, and that the taking is
reasonably necessary to achieve the public benefit (i.e. that there
are no other reasonable alternatives to accomplishing this
objective). This second test approaches an intermediate level of
scrutiny because of the higher level of potential for abuse in a
category two taking than with a category one taking. A category
three taking (either a category one or category two taking, but
where the land taken is the property owner's home) would be
treated at an even higher level of scrutiny than a category two
taking because when a person loses her home, the nature of the
property interest lost is often more fundamental than the pure
economic loss typically suffered when other property is taken and
because in this context the uncompensated, subjective value lost
can be very high. Consequently, under a category three taking,
the government must demonstrate that an important public
benefit is being served through the taking of a person's home,
determined based upon the government providing evidence that
there is a "net social benefit" from the taking.2
II. CAN

A CITY Now CONDEMN ANY PROPERTY IF THE CITY MERELY
SHOWS THAT THE NEW USE OF THE PROPERTY WILL INCREASE THE
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY?

Some critics of the Kelo decision have argued that in light of
20. A specialized traditional taking is one where the government enjoys a
presumption of a public benefit, but a proposed taking will be invalidated if
the party challenging it can show that the asserted public benefit from the
taking is so speculative that it is illusory, or provide evidence that the real
reason for the taking is to confer a private benefit rather than a public benefit.
See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part VI.
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this case it would be possible to condemn Justice Souter's 200 year
old farmhouse in Weare, New Hampshire and to replace it with a
luxury hotel even when the purpose of the taking is simply to
benefit the developer of the hotel or out of malice towards Justice
Souter for joining the majority opinion in Kelo. This argument
builds on Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the majority opinion
in Kelo that nothing would really stop a city from condemning a
private property owner's home in order to transfer it to another
private property owner who will use it for a more profitable use
since it can be claimed that due to the increase in tax revenues the
public is benefited, and thus the public use requirement would be
satisfied. But would such a forced transfer of private property be
upheld
in light of the majority ruling in Kelo? The answer is
23
"no."

Justice Stevens emphasized in his majority opinion that to be
valid, the transfer of the private property to another private
property owner based on the argument of public benefit must be
done in the context of an "integrated development plan."24 Any
transfer to a private property owner made without such an
integrated development plan would "raise a suspicion that a

22. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Understanding 'Kelo': Why Justice Souter
Should be Praised, THE UNION LEADER, August 3, 2005, at A9 (stating that
the criticism to the Kelo decision has become personal and has caused some
opponents of the decision to join in a campaign to seize Supreme Court Justice
David H. Souter's farmhouse to build a luxury hotel in honor of the United
States Constitution).
23. An interesting wrinkle that this hypothetical poses is that even under
the O'Connor dissenting opinion, this abusive hypothetical taking might
nevertheless satisfy the "public use" requirement since she defines public use
to mean not only pubic ownership but also simply "use by the public." Kelo,
125 S.Ct. at 2675 (2005) (O'Conner, J., dissenting). The development of the
property for a hotel would lead to a use by the public and therefore satisfy the
public use test. This is the problem with relying solely upon a literal
interpretation of public use as a means to prevent abusive takings (a topic
further discussed infra Part III). Although the abusive taking for a hotel
would not fly under Justice Thomas' interpretation of public use in his
dissenting opinion, if the same taking occurred where the end use were a
public park, then this apparently would be permitted. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Thomas states that the natural reading of the public use
requirement is that the property is owned by the government after the taking
or if the public has the right to use the property after the taking. Id. at 267071 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Since a hotel owner can generally exclude others
from using the hotel unless doing so in a manner that violates federal, state,
or local anti-discrimination laws, such use would not be a public use as Justice
Thomas interprets that clause. But once it is determined by the court that
after the taking the property would be owned by the government or the
property would be subject to the public's right of use (the public park
scenario), it would appear that even under Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion
the taking would be upheld. Id.
24. Id. at 2666-67.
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private purpose was afoot". 5 A condemnation of only one small
piece of land to convey it to a private person or entity for the
purpose of developing on it a single hotel, unless part of an
integrated development plan, would be suspicious indeed, and
based upon the dicta in the Stevens opinion a court would not find
such a taking to be for a "public use."
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens cites to two cases for
the proposition that the governmental entity performing the
taking must provide a "reasoned explanation" for the taking.2" In
the first of these decisions, 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster
Redevelopment
Agency,27
the
court
emphasized
that
notwithstanding judicial deference to the legislative determination
of "public use," courts should scrutinize if the alleged public use is
a pretext or valid. The court ruled that when there is evidence
that the purpose of the taking is to appease a private property
owner a court should enjoin such taking for failing to satisfy the
public use requirement. 8
The second decision that Justice
Stevens cited to, City of Cincinnati v. Vester,n similarly involved a
court examining the real purpose of the condemnation. In Vester,
the court noted that the lower courts in that case had concluded
the real reason for the condemnation of more land than necessary
for the public improvement was to resell the excess for a profit in
the future to pay for the improvement, rather than the valid
purposes the city asserted during litigation (such as providing for
a suitably sized remaining property after the taking)."

25. Id.
26. Id. at 2667.
27. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
28. Id. at 1125-27. In 99 Cents, the redevelopment agency condemned
certain land leased by 99 Cents Only Stores at the demand of a larger tenant,
Costco, who threatened to relocate to another city if they were not able to
expand into the space leased by 99 Cents. The redevelopment agency
attempted to condemn the land leased by 99 Cents in order to prevent future
blight, which they feared would occur if Costco relocated. Id. at 1126-27. The
court concluded that appeasing Costco is not a valid public purpose and that
there was no statutory authority to condemn to prevent "future" blight. Id. at
1131.
29. 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
30. Vester, 281 U.S. at 444. The Court in Vester implied that the city may
have been improperly motivated, as the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint
"that the excess condemnation is 'a mere speculation upon an anticipated
increase in the value of the properties adjacent to said improvement,' and that
the properties were taken 'with the design of reselling the same at a profit to

private individuals to be used for private purposes, and no use of said property
by or for the public is intended or contemplated.'" Id. at 443. The Court hints
at impropriety when it states:
[The] City's contention is so broad that it defeats itself. It is not enough
that property may be devoted hereafter to a public use for which there
could have been an appropriate condemnation. Under the guise of an
excess condemnation pursuant to the authority of the constitutional
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Applying these two cases that Justice Stevens cited with
approval in the Kelo case to our hypothetical, it strongly appears
that Justice Stevens would have invalidated a taking where the
governmental entity failed to provide evidence of a valid purpose,
and where the evidence to the contrary indicated a purpose that is
private in nature or based on ill will towards the property owner.
The need for the "reasoned explanation" of the purpose for the
taking is particularly pressing in contexts where the end use is not
clear on its face to be a "public use." As the court in Vester stated:
"The importance of the definition of purpose would be even greater
in the case of taking property not directly to be occupied by a
proposed pubic improvement than in the case of the latter which
might more clearly speak for itself."31 This dicta suggests that
courts should apply a higher level of scrutiny to the purpose
behind the taking when the taking does not on its face involve a
literal public use.32 By citing with approval to these two cases on
the need for a "reasoned explanation" for the taking, Justice
Stevens strongly implies that if the alleged "public use" is in fact a
pretext a court should enjoin the taking and that courts should
more closely scrutinize the purpose of a taking when the taking
does not involve a literal public use.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion expressly provides
support for a court to rule that the hypothetical taking would not
satisfy the "public use" requirement. Justice Kennedy notes that if
it can be shown that the legislative intent was to favor a private
property owner and that the public benefit was just a pretext, then
the court should strike down the taking. "A court applying
rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike
down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a
particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits . . . ."" In the hypothetical, if Justice Souter were to
provide evidence that the real motivation for the taking of his
home was out of malice towards him, or to prove a point about the
Kelo case, or simply to benefit the hotel owner, then the court
would strike down the taking. When Justice Kennedy joined in
the majority opinion in Kelo (and he was the necessary fifth vote)
he emphasized that he did so only because certain facts existed
provision of Ohio, private property could not be taken for some
independent and undisclosed public use. Either no definition of purpose
is required in the case of excess condemnation, a view of the statute
which cannot be entertained, or the purpose of the excess condemnation
must be suitably defined. In this view, in the absence of such a
definition, the appropriation must fail by reason of non-compliance with
statutory authority.
Id. at 448.
31. Id. at 447
32. Id.
33. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2699 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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which negated the appearance of a pretextual public benefit.
"Here, the trial court conducted a careful and extensive inquiry
into 'whether, in fact, the development plan is of primary benefit
to... the developer.., and private businesses which may
eventually locate in the plan area..., and in that regard, only of
incidental benefit to the city.'"'
Justice Kennedy pointed to several factors that existed in the
Kelo case that led to his joining in the majority opinion, but noted
that in the absence of these factors a closer scrutiny of the taking
would be in order.
My agreement with the Court that a presumption of invalidity is not
warranted for economic development takings in general, or for the
particular takings at issue in this case, does not foreclose the
possibility that a more stringent standard of review than that
announced inBerman or Midkiff might be appropriate for a more
narrowly drawn category of takings. There may be private transfers
in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private
parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of
invalidity is warranted [emphasis added] under the Public Use
Clause. ...
This demanding level of scrutiny, however, is not
required simply because the purpose of the taking is economic
development.35
Justice Kennedy identified five aspects of the Kelo case to treat it
in the same deferential manner as the court treated the takings in
Berman and Midkiff, all or most of which would likely be absent in
the hypothetical: (1) a taking occurring in the context of a
comprehensive development plan; (2) the plan was intended to
address a serious city-wide depression; (3) the projected economic
benefits of the project cannot be characterized as de minimus; (4)
the identity of most of the private beneficiaries were unknown at
the time the city formulated its plans; and (5) the city complied
with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate review of
the record and inquiry into the city's purposes.' In light of this,
the city in our hypothetical would have to create a "comprehensive
development plan" and that plan would have to be directed
towards satisfying an important public benefit (such as addressing
a serious city-wide depression) for a majority of the Court to apply
the deferential approach to the challenged taking.
Equally
important, in Justice Kennedy's concurrence, the city would be
required to create elaborate procedural requirements to allow
review of the record and inquiry into the city's purposes. If the
real purpose behind taking Justice Souter's house in the
hypothetical was to benefit a hotel owner and the taking is not
part of a genuine comprehensive development plan to address a
34. Id. at 2669 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 2670 (internal citation omitted).
36. Id.
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serious economic problem, the taking will not be upheld.
Finally, if the purpose of the taking is to harm Justice Souter
and motivated by ill will towards him, then clearly the taking
would be enjoined. Justice Stevens in Kelo also cited with
approval to Village of Willowbrook v. Olech" in which the Court
ruled that when a property owner is treated differently from other
property owners (the city required a thirty-three foot easement in
the case as a condition to connect the property owner's property to
the city water supply, while requiring only a fifteen foot easement
from other property owners) based on ill will rather than a
rational basis, such action violates the Equal Protection Clause
and will be struck down. The facts in Olech are similar to the facts
in our hypothetical and as such the taking would be enjoined.
III. DO THE CASES CITED TO BY THE COURTS IN BERMAN, MIDKIFF,
AND KELO REALLY SUPPORT JUDICIAL DEFERENCE To LEGISLATIVE
JUDGMENTS OF PUBLIC USE IN A NON-TRADITIONAL TAKING
SETTING?

Perhaps the most problematic dicta from the Kelo case were
those which articulated extreme deference to legislative judgments
as to public use in a non-traditional taking context. The Court in
Kelo stated: "'When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical
debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over the
wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be
carried out in the federal courts.' 38 The Court in Kelo later stated:
"Just as we decline to second-guess the City's considered
judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also
decline to second-guess the City's determinations as to what lands
it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project." 9 In support
of this deferential approach, the Court cited to the Berman and
Midkiff cases.'

37. 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000).
38. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (1984)).
39. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36
(1954)).
40. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660-61. In addition to Berman and Midkiff, the
Court in Kelo cited to three other Supreme Court cases for a deferential
approach, but these three cases themselves cited to and relied upon Berman
and Midkiff to support their deferential dicta, see Hairston v. Danville & W. R.
Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908) (stating, after the deferential language, "[wie
must not be understood as saying that cases may not arise where this court
would decline to follow the state courts in their determination of the uses for
which land could be taken by the right of eminent domain"); National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992) (involving a
taking to benefit Amtrak, a private, for-profit corporation created by an Act of
Congress to serve the public's transportation needs); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013-15 (1984) (finding that the publication of a trade secret
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But, it is an interesting question whether the Berman and
Midkiff cases themselves cite to case law that truly supports the
application of this deference in the context of a "non-traditional"
taking.4' If the cases cited to by the Court in Berman and Midkiff
do not support such a deferential approach in a non-traditional
exercise of eminent domain, then the Court should re-examine the
wisdom of this dicta and its application to future "non-traditional"
takings.
There are four places in the Berman case where the Court
articulates a deferential approach for courts to take towards a
legislative judgment of what is for the public benefit or whether
exercise of the eminent domain power is necessary to achieve the
public purpose. In the first instance, the Court states:
Subject to specific Constitutional limitations, when the Legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive. In such cases the Legislature, not the judiciary, is the
main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation,
whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of
Columbia ...or the States legislating concerning local affairs. 4'
The Court cites to four cases in support of this statement.43 In
none of these cases, however, was the issue related to eminent
domain. In the first case cited, Block v. Hirsh, the law at issue
was a law permitting tenants to remain in possession beyond the
term of their lease."4 In the second case cited, Olsen v. State of
Nebraska, the issue was whether a law prohibiting price fixing
violated the due process clause.45
In the third case, Lincoln
Federal labor Union No. 19129, A.F. of L. V. Northwestern Co., the
issue was whether laws forbidding employers from entering into
contract to exclude non-union members from employment were
constitutional." In the fourth case, California State Auto. Asso.
Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Maloney, the issue was whether
legislation requiring insurers to provide insurance to all persons
eligible violated the Due Process Clause.47
by the EPA to allow greater competition among producers can be a taking
when interfering with distinct investment backed-expectations, but when
compensated, would comply with the Fifth Amendment since the procompetitive purpose is within the police powers of Congress).
41. See infra Part III.

42. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). (internal citation omitted).
43. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236
(1941); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525 (1949); California State Auto. Ass'n. Inter-Insurance Bureau v.
Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
44.
45.
46.
47.

Block, 256 U.S. at 153.
Olsen, 313 U.S. at 243.
Lincoln FederalLabor Union, 335 U.S. at 529.
CaliforniaState Auto. Ass'n. Inter-InsuranceBureau, 341 U.S. at 108.
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The second place where Berman contains deferential
language occurs immediately after the first statement quoted
above and states: "This principle admits of no exception merely
because the power of eminent domain is involved. The role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for
a public purpose is an extremely narrow one."48 The Court in
Berman then cites to two Supreme Court decisions for support of
this assertion: Old Dominion Land Co. v. U.S.49 and United States
ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch.5 ° Old Dominion did
involve an exercise of eminent domain, however, the land taken
would be owned by the federal government and was to be used for
a quartermaster warehouse. 5' Consequently, although there is
dicta in Old Dominion that courts should defer to legislative
judgments, 2 because the case involves an exercise of eminent
domain where the government will own the property after the
taking rather than a private property, this case does not truly
support judicial deference in the context of a taking where a
private party will become the owner of the property after the
taking. Tennessee Valley Authority also involved the exercise of
eminent domain, but, as with Old Dominion, the government
would own the real property after the taking, and the real
property was to be used to create a dam.53 Neither Old Dominion
nor Tennessee Valley Authority provides support for judicial
deference to a legislative judgment of public use in the context of a
"non-traditional taking"54 (and one more susceptible to abuse)
where a private party ends up the owner of the property.
In the third place in Berman where the Court articulated a
deferential approach for courts to take when reviewing the
government's exercise of eminent domain, the Court stated: "the
means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress
alone to determine, once the public purpose has been
established."" In support of the statement not to independently
scrutinize the "means" issue (i.e., whether the taking was
necessary to achieve the public purpose), the Court in Berman
cited to two Supreme Court cases. The first case, Luxton v. North
River Bridge Co, involved the construction of a bridge between
New York and New Jersey and granting control of the bridge to a
private third party for construction and maintenance. 6

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
269 U.S. 55 (1925).
327 U.S. 546 (1946).
Old Dominion, 269 U.S. at 63-64.
Id. at 66.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 327 U.S. at 548.
See infra Part III.
Id.
153 U.S. 525 (1894).
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Facilitating travel open to the public use as a matter of right is a
traditional example of use of eminent domain, even when a private
party is given control over construction and maintenance of the
bridge and ultimate ownership.57 Consequently, the Luxton case
does not support the notion that courts should not scrutinize
whether a taking is necessary when done in the context of a nontraditional taking setting where the potential for abuse of process
is far greater. In the second case, Highland v. Russell Car & Snow
Plow Company, the issue did not involve a direct taking of land,
but instead whether an order of the President under the Lever Act
fixing a maximum price on coal during World War I to ensure
adequate food, fuel, and other resources necessary to prosecute the
war violated the right to carry out private contract in respect of
property under the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteen
Amendments.'
Regulations such as these are quite
distinguishable from a direct taking of land and do not support the
notion that courts should not scrutinize the means chosen when
those means relate to a direct taking of property in a nontraditional context.
The final dicta in Berman that articulates that courts should
defer to a legislative judgment states: "Once the question of the
pubic purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land
to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to
complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the
legislative branch."59 Berman cited to three cases as support for
this statement. The first of these cases was Shoemaker v. United
States, which involved a direct taking of land, but for the purpose
of creating a public park, an example of a traditional exercise of
eminent domain.' The second of these cases was the Tennessee
Valley Authority case previously discussed, which involved
creation of a dam by a governmental entity, and is also an example
of a traditional exercise of eminent domain.6 The third case was
United States v. Carmack which involved a taking of land for use
as a post-office, another example of a traditional exercise of
eminent domain. 2 In sum, none of the cases cited by the Court in
Berman provide support for courts to defer to a legislative
judgment of the public benefit or necessity of the taking to achieve
the public benefit in the context of a non-traditional taking.
The Court in Kelo also heavily relied upon the Midkiff case as
57. Id. at 529-30 (stating that Congress can build bridges to be used in
interstate commerce either directly or by giving control to a corporation).
58. 279 U.S. 253, 262 (1929).
59. Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36.
60. 147 U.S. 282, 297 (1893).

61. 327 U.S. at 548.
62. 329 U.S. 230, 247-48 (1946).
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precedent for the position that courts should defer to legislative
judgments of the public benefit and need for the taking.' There
are four instances where the Court in Midkiff articulates this
deferential approach. In the first instance, the Court in Midkiff
stated, after citing to Berman for some of the judicial deference
language described above, "The 'public use' requirement is thus
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."6 It is
unclear what this sentence really means and as some have pointed
out, this can not mean literally what is seems to, because if it did
then there would be no need to compensate for a forced taking of
fee simple title if there were a legitimate police powers type public
benefit to the taking.'
In the second instance, the court in Midkiff states: "In short,
the Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment
for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use
'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation. '"'
In
support of this statement the Court quoted United States v.
Gettysburg Electric R. Co., which involved a law to fund
condemnations for the purpose of creating a national monument to
memorialize the site where a civil war battle took place. 7 Taking
land to create a national memorial that presumably would be open
to the public to view, although a more unusual use of land then
say for a public library, should be considered to fall within a
traditional type taking.
In the third instance, the Court in Midkiff states: "But where
the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause"
and cites to four cases as support.' The first case Midkiff cites to
is the Berman case previously discussed. The second case the
Court in Midkiff cited to is Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, which
involved a taking of land for a public highway, a traditional
exercise of eminent domain.'
The third case cited to is Block v.
63. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
64. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229, 240.
65. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.,
61, 72 (1986).
66. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric
R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
67. 160 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1896). Also of interest regarding this case is the
Court's statement that courts should be deferential to legislative judgments of
public use because the government must pay full compensation for a taking,
requiring the government to tax in order to pay for the taking, thus requiring
the public support for the taking. Id. at 685. Today it is recognized that the
fair market value limitation to "just compensation" does not fully compensate
property owners for their full losses from a taking, see infra Part VI, calling
the judicial deference standard into question even for a traditional taking.
68. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
69. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
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Hirsh, which did not even involve a direct taking of land, but
instead a statute that allowed tenants to remain in possession of
their leased real estate after the expiration of the term of their
lease under certain conditions. ° The final case cited to in Midkiff
is Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., which also did not involve
a direct taking of property, but instead whether an order limiting
the amount of gas production equaled a taking of property."
In the fourth and final instance, the Court in Midkiff states
"whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not
the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied
if... [the state] Legislature rationallycould have believed that the
[Act] would promote its objective." 2 The Court in Midkiff cited to
three cases in support, but none involved an exercise of eminent
domain. The first case cited, Western & Southern Life Insu. Co. v.
State Bd. Of Equalization,involved the validity of a tax under the
interstate commerce clause.73 The second case cited, Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., involved the validity of a ban on certain
milk containers under the interstate commerce clause.74 The third
and last case cited, Vance v. Bradley, involved the validity of an
act under an equal protection analysis."
There were two cases cited to in Berman and one case in
Midkiff that involved potentially non-traditional condemnations
where a private entity, rather than the government, would own
the land condemned, but these cases were not cited as support for
a deferential review of public use. Instead, one case, PuertoRico v.
Eastern Sugar Associates,1 was cited to by the Court in Midkiff as
support for the conclusion that regulating the evils of oligopoly
was a valid public purpose.77 The other two cases, Hunter v.
Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Authority and Gohld Realty Co.
8
v. Hartford,"
were cited by the Court in Berman as support for the
concept that it is proper to use the eminent domain power even
over areas not blighted, but nearly blighted, in order to prevent
the cycle of decay. Although these three cases permit a privateprivate forced transfer of land, they contain dicta which involves
judicial scrutiny of the terms of the transfer to determine if there
really is a public benefit to the taking.
The court in the Hunter case ruled that a condemnation by a
housing authority to eliminate slum areas was a proper public use
70. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).

71. Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
72. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981).
74. 449 U.S. 456, 458 (1981).
75. 440 U.S. 93, 94-95 (1979).
76. 156 F.2d 316 (1946).
77. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242.
78. Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 104 A.2d 365 (Conn. 1954); Hunter v.
Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 78 S.E.2d 893 (Va. 1953).
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even though the land was transferred to a private entity because,
the court noted, the grant was subject to restrictions which were
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act. 79 The court in the
Gohld Realty case held that a redevelopment plan involving the
forced taking of land and transferring the land to a private entity
was constitutional, but also stated that it was up to the court to
determine if the government's public use determination was
unreasonable, in bad faith, or an abuse of power. ° Finally, the
court in the Puerto Rico case, using highly deferential dicta, ruled
a law constitutional that facilitated forced private-to-private
transfers to reduce the negative conditions on the public from the
historically heavy reliance on the sugar industry in Puerto Rico. 8'
However, the court did not abdicate judicial review and ultimately
required that the legislative judgment on public use be reasonable
rather than arbitrary in terms of the goal and the means chosen to
achieve the goal.
[Ilt is our duty to determine whether their enactment rested upon
an arbitrary belief of the existence of the evils they were intended to
remedy, and whether the means chosen are reasonably believed by
And thus, although we cannot
the Legislature to exist ....
substitute our estimate of the extent of the evils aimed at for that of
the Insular Legislature, we are required to make some inquiry into
the facts with reference to which the Legislature acted ....
Our function is only to determine the reasonableness of the
Legislature's belief in the existence of the evils and in the
effectiveness of the remedy provided. In performing this function
we have no occasion to consider whether all the statements of fact
which may be the basis of the prevailing belief are well-founded;
2
and we have, of course, no right to weigh conflicting evidence.
In summary then, none of the cases cited to by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the Midkiff and Berman cases (which in turn were relied
upon by the Supreme Court in the Kelo case) provide support for
extreme judicial deference to a legislative judgment in a nontraditional taking. Although there were three cases among the
group cited to in Berman and Midkiff where the Court ruled that a
private-private transfer did not violate the public use requirement,
the court in each of these cases advocated a judicial role in
determining whether the legislative judgment regarding the public
benefit was reasonable. Of the remaining cases that did involve a
direct exercise of the eminent domain power, the land taken was
ultimately owned by a public entity or created a use that was open
to the public and non-commercial in nature. Such takings are
examples of a traditional exercise of eminent domain that are less
79.
80.
81.
82.

Hunter, 78 S.E.2d at 901.
Gohld Realty Co., 104 A.2d at 371.
156 F.2d 316.
Id. at 324 (footnote and internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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likely to be abused and therefore deference to a legislative
determination makes more sense in that context than when the
context of the taking makes it more likely to be abused such as in
a non-traditional taking.
IV. HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY V. M1DKIFF- THE UNTOLD STORY
AND A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE NEED FOR CLOSER JUDICIAL
SCRUTINY

In upholding the constitutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform
Act of 1967, the Court in Midkiff emphasized the small number of
private landholders that owned a very large percentage of the land
in Hawaii, which the court characterized as a vestige of the feudal
land tenure system.n The court then noted that the Hawaii
Legislature concluded that this "concentrated land ownership was
responsible for skewing the State's residential fee simple market,
inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and
welfare.""
The Court further noted that "[u]nder the Act's
condemnation scheme, tenants living on single-family residential
lots within developmental tracts at least five acres in size are
entitled to ask the Hawaii Housing Authority ... to condemn the
property on which they live"' and that the tenants under the Act
could receive financing for their purchase of the fee title to the
land they were living at (although the court also mentioned,
without any explanation or elaboration, that in practice the
tenants who had purchased the fee had done so by providing their
own funds).' The court ruled that the exercise of the taking power
in the Land Reform Act met the public use requirement because
the Hawaii Legislature was attempting through the Act to reduce
the social and economic evils of land oligopoly, which evils the
legislature specifically identified as "artificial deterrents to the
normal
functioning
of
the
State's
residential
land
market... [which] forced thousands of individual homeowners to
lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes."87 The
Court then stated that "[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils
associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers. " '
Based upon the version of the facts recited in the Midkiff
83. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232. But see, THURSTON TWIGG-SMITH, HAWAIIAN

SOVEREIGNTY: DO THE FACTS MATTER 262-63 (Barbara A. Hastings ed., 1998)
(remarking that land reform efforts in 1848 by the King and his advisors,
which involved the transfer of fee simple title to land to three-quarters of the
native Hawaiians for farming, did not work because of the difficulty with
farming and a lack of understanding of what ownership meant and caused
many of these new owners to sell their fee simple title).
84. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 233.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 241.
Id.
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case, one is under the impression that a small number of private
landholders who owned vast amounts of land were taking
advantage of the scarcity of available fee simple title to land to
pocket huge financial rewards in the form of exorbitant rents, but
that poor, working class, and middle class tenants would be
benefited by the Land Reform Act by forcing the landlords to sell
to these tenants the lands they were leasing to live on. The reality
was far different.
First, although the court does not mention or address this, the
"private" landholders, in particular the entity that challenged the
Land Reform Act in the Midkiff case, was actually a charitable
trust, the "Bishop Estate", established to benefit native Hawaiian
school children.89 The Bishop Estate will stated as its purpose: "to
erect and maintain in the Hawaiian Islands two schools, each for
boarding and day scholars, one for boys and one for girls, to be
The
known as, and called, the Kamehameha Schools.""
establishment of these schools promoted the public good because
"In socio-economic terms Hawaiian children were about the
Islands' most underprivileged people, with among the most social
problems."91 Indeed, the Bishop Estate's property represented the
bulk of the endowment of the Kamehameha Schools.92 Since the
income from the Bishop Estate benefited poor native Hawaiian
school children, many viewed the Bishop Estate landholdings as in
essence owned by native Hawaiians. "It would be a shame and
disgrace for us here, who are really foreigners in Hawaii, to take
from the Hawaiians what is justly theirs," stated one of the
When the Land Reform Act
senators in opposition to the bill.
was in its final senate debate, of the ninety spectators watching,
forty were Hawaiians wearing red ribbons symbolizing opposition
to the measure.9 ' The brief of the Appellant, Bishop Estate,
pointed out to the Court this charitable nature of the Bishop
Estate," but the Court did not consider this in its opinion and
chose instead to defer to the legislative pronounced version of the
facts.
The trustees of this charitable estate were reluctant to sell
the land primarily because they believed that selling the land
would be contrary to the intent of the trust, which was to educate
89. DAN BOYLAN & MICHAEL T. HOLMES, JOHN A. BURNS: THE MAN AND
His TIMES 200 (2000) (the "Bishop Estate['s] property represented the bulk of
the endowment of the Kamehameha Schools.").
90. TWIGO-SMITH, supra note 83, at 262-263.
91. GEORGE COOPER & GAvAN DAWS, LAND AND POWER IN HAWAII: THE

DEMOCRATIC YEARS 428 (University of Hawaii Press 1990) (1985).
92. BOYLAN & HOLMES, supra note 89, at 200.
93. Id. at 201.

94. Id.
95. Brief for Appellees at 27, Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (Nos. 83-141, 83-236, 83283).
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Indeed, a comparison of
native Hawaii children in perpetuity.9
the fate of the Lunalilo Estate (set up to benefit elderly Hawaiian
natives) with the fate of the Bishop Estate demonstrates the
wisdom of the trustees of the Bishop Estate in holding onto the
lands that were part of the estate. The Lunalilo Estate had a
holding larger than the Bishop Estate,97 but the trustees of the
Lunalilo Estate sold off the lands, built a home for the elderly
Hawaiians, and invested the remaining proceeds in other
conservative investments. 98 As of 1998, only one Lunalilo Home
still existed and the income of the trust barely met its needs; while
the assets of the Bishop Estate were valued as high as $10
billion.' In addition, there was a sense that the true owners of the
Bishop Estate were Hawaiian children, and there was a desire to
ensure that native Hawaiians continue to have this interest in
Hawaiian land:
The beneficiaries of the Bishop Estate were ethnic Hawaiians. The
Hawaiian community in general strongly opposed Bishop selling
Hawaiians' statements in defense of
much or any of its land ....
the system tended to recall their peoples' loss of land in the
We feel that pressure for land reform then
nineteenth century ....
was due more to a rising generation of Western investors than from
the native Hawaiian himself. We cannot but feel that pressure for
land reform now is due not to the poorer man - among who are a
great many Hawaiians - but from a new generation of investors
from East and West. 100
Second, by the 1980s the economic status of the tenants who
would benefit from the Land Reform Act had changed
dramatically.
When [the bills that would become the Land Reform Act] were being
debated through the 1950s and 1960s, the lessees were an ethnically
and politically diverse group of middle and working-class people,
spread all around the developed parts of Oahu. By the mid-1980s,
the geographic, economic, social and political characteristics of
lessees were more constricted. As mentioned, about three-quarters
of all lessees were now living on Bishop Estate land, mostly in
relatively desirable areas in east and windward Oahu. The majority
were middle and upper-class haoles and local-Asians, and the

96. TWIGG-SMITH, supra note 83, at 257. There were also federal income
tax consequences that the charitable trusts wished to avoid and this explains
why at one point the trusts worked with the legislature on how to structure a
forced taking in order to prevent the imposition of capital gains taxes.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.
97. TWIGG-SMITH, supra note 83, at 262-63.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. COOPER & DAWS, supra note 91, at 428-29.
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district where they lived tended to vote Republican. 01
Indeed, the wealthy status of the tenants who had purchased the
fee title to their leased land is underscored by the fact (one the
Court only mentions in passing) that, in practice, none of the
tenants needed to use the financing from the government available
under the Land Reform Act to purchase fee title to the land they
were leasing.0 2 The Brief for the Appellees raised the point more
than once that the tenants who were now to benefit from the Act
were wealthy, yet the Court failed to address this. 3 "The
beneficiaries of Chapter 516 are not the elderly or infirm, but the
residents of Honolulu's upper-income neighborhoods who desire to
acquire Trustee's fee title for their own private use and who have
the economic means to do so.""° Yet, the Court chose to ignore the
evidence that the Appellee provided on these matters and to defer
instead to the legislative pronouncements.
Third, although the Court relied in its ruling on the Hawaiian
Legislature's conclusion that the land oligopoly had led to a
scarcity of fee simple land (an evil associated with land oligopoly
that was a key rationale for the Act), and although a finding of
such land scarcity was a requirement under the original Land
Reform Act, this requirement was dropped in a 1976 amendment
to the Act.' 0 The Court did not scrutinize the impact of this
amendment on the Hawaii Legislature's stated public benefit from
the Act, even though the Brief for the Appellee called the Court's
attention to the fact that this requirement was no longer a part of
the Act and that no such finding was required for the taking before
them. 1" The brief also noted that 97% of the land statewide was
zoned for non-urban, non-residential uses, that the state owned
34.5% of the land, and that the state had the authority to use
public lands for residential purposes, but the state had generally
chosen not to do so. 0 7 Indeed, when the Land Reform Act was first
enacted, the Governor of Hawaii during this period, John A.
Burns, did not enforce it because he believed that "zoning and tax
measures were a better road to land reform." ' If there was no
scarcity of available fee simple title at the time of the taking, then
what was the public benefit to forcing the sale of certain leased
land?
Fourth, although the Act was characterized as assisting
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
STAT.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 412.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 95, at 105 n. 169.
Id. at 113.
1976 HAw. SESS. LAWS ACT ch. 242, § 2 (current version at HAW. REV.
§ 516-21 (2006)).
Brief for Appellees, supra note 95, at 35-36.
Id. at 112.
BOYLAN & HOLMES, supra note 89, at 235.
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tenants living on this land to purchase fee simple title to the land,
the Act was amended in 1978 to remove the requirement that the
tenant-acquirer live in the tract to be condemned."°
This
amendment made it possible for wealthier tenant-speculators to
take advantage of the Act.1 1 The Brief for Appellee highlighted
this fact to the Court, but, again, the Court, apparently based
upon its observance of judicial deference, ignored it. If the tenant
was not actually living on the land she was leasing, then the
tenant is acting as much like an investor in the land as the
landlord. The tenant could now as the new owner choose to lease
the land they now owned at rents even higher than the charitable
trusts were charging. This was because the Land Reform Act
placed no restrictions on the use or alienation by a tenant turned
fee simple titleholder under the Act, and the rent control laws that
the Bishop Estate were subject to under other Hawaiian
Legislation did not apply to these lands after they were
condemned under the Land Reform Act."' If the Land Reform Act
as amended now permitted wealthy, investor type tenants to force
the charitable trusts to sell land to them, land previously used to
benefit the least advantaged citizens of the state, what is the
public benefit in this?
Both of these amendments destroyed what was supposed to
be the essence of the public benefit aspects of the Act: to address
land scarcity and social upheavals allegedly resulting from the
lack of available fee simple title to lands. Had the Court more
closely scrutinized the Act (by focusing on the amendments to the
Act that took place prior to the takings at issue in the case before
them) and the current facts (many of which were raised by the
Appellee in its brief to the Court) the Court would have discovered
that the "Land Reform Act" may have been a populist type reform
in name, but operated far different in reality:
What could in, say, 1960, have reasonably been called 'land reform'
through application of a Maryland-type law, redistributing land
away from the more fortunate to the less, had by the 1980s come in
a way to look like the opposite-a fairly prosperous group securing
for itself by leasehold conversion a useful economic benefit, and over
the objections of1 2the representatives of a socially deprived and
oppressed group.
The legislation which really served as a populist type land reform
in Hawaii was the rent control law that was enacted in response to
the sudden imposition of extremely high new rents in the mid1970s as former long term leases (fifty-five year terms to conform

109.
110.
111.
112.

Brief for Appellees, supra note 95, at 36.
Id.
Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 803 (9th Cir. 1983).
COOPER & DAWS, supra note 91, at 412-13.
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with Federal Housing Administration requirements for leasehold
loans) came due and were being renegotiated." 3 "Since the initial
rent had been set in something of a buyers' market and at a time
of relatively low land prices in Hawaii, by the early 1970s rents
were very low in relation to market value. When renegotiated
they increased dramatically."1 4 In addition, landlords expected to
recover the cost of "off site improvements" that they had made
fifty-five years earlier in the form of the new rents they would
negotiate."' The new rents were calculated as a percentage of the
current fair market value of the real estate and when the Bishop
Estate decided to use 4.28% of the market value of the land as the
basis to calculate the new rents it led to increases of 1,000% from
the rents set fifty-five years earlier, with rents on average in 1974
moving from $350-$400 per year to $5,000 per year."'
The rent control law imposed a ceiling on renegotiated rents
so that the annual rent could not exceed four percent of the
market value of the land. Although this figure seems not much
better than the 4.28% charged by the Bishop Estate, even slight
differences in the percentage would have a large impact on actual
rents charged because due to an economic boom in Hawaii and an
increase in demand for land, the land values had increased
"hundreds of percent" since the leases were first negotiated fiftyfive years earlier." 7 Even if the rent control law produced rents
that some tenants on fixed incomes had difficulty paying
financially (the tenants who had benefited from the below market
rents for a long period also had emotional difficulty with paying
such an increased rent since their states of mind "were fixed at the
level of their old rent")," 8 it still more directly and better ensured
that tenants could afford to remain in possession of their homes
than did the forced sale law. This is because, as previously noted,
by the 1980s it was mainly middle and upper income tenants who
were seeking to force the sale of the land to themselves and they
could then charge any rent on their newly acquired land if they
decided to lease it." 9 In addition, the rent control law, through
reducing the return that landowners could make from their land
ownership (the rate of return on investments in real property
outside of Hawaii according to the Frank Russell Property Index
from 1977-1979 was eighteen percent) led many landowners to
voluntarily sell their land in order to reinvest in more profitable
investments. This wave of voluntary sales substantially increased

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 419.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420-21.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 428.
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the number of fee simple title properties for sale, with most large
landholders subject to the rent control laws selling their properties
for better returns elsewhere, but the Bishop Estate still holding
out since the beneficiaries of the estate were native Hawaiians and
the trustees desired that native Hawaiians continue to be the

owners of Hawaiian land. 120

In light of the charitable nature of the Bishop Estate and the
economic situation the Bishop Estate was operating under at the
time of the renegotiation of these long-term leases, one author who
wrote a book on land and power in Hawaii asks: "In proposing
large rent increases, were the landlords, Bishop in particular,
acting like cynical, gouging land barons as many of their lessees
believed? Or were the landlords simply asking for their due, as
determined by ordinary business standards, and what, in the case
of Bishop, the trustees believed best for the Hawaiian children
who were the estate's beneficiaries?"
Through a more close scrutiny of the facts in Midkiff, the
Court would have discovered that the alleged public benefits from
the forced takings of private property under the Land Reform Act
as amended and as in operation in 1984 when the case was argued
before the Court did not exist in reality. A powerful argument
could be made that the public was more harmed by the Land
Reform Act as amended than benefited by it. As such, the Court
should have found that the Act as amended did not satisfy the
public use requirement and was unconstitutional.
Ironically,
although the dicta from the Midkiff case provides case law support
for judicial deference to a government's assertion of public benefit
in a private-to-private transfer, a closer look at the facts in the
Midkiff case provides a telling example of the problems with
judicial deference in this more potentially abusive setting, and the
importance of having courts more closely scrutinize the alleged
public benefit when the government exercises its taking power in
this setting.
V. NOLLAN AND DOLAN PROVIDE CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS FOR
APPLYING A HIGHER LEVEL OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY WHEN A
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION OCCURS IN A CONTEXT WITH A
HIGHER LIKELIHOOD OF ABUSE OF PROCESS

The real problem with the Kelo case is not that the majority
failed to exclude from the concept of "public use" all takings
directed towards economic development, but instead that the court
applied the most deferential standard of review in the context of a
taking which by its very nature (a private-to-private transfer)
made the taking more "suspect" than in the more traditional
taking for a public highway or public library. Justice Kennedy had
120. Id. at 421, 428, 435.
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it right when he concluded that when the circumstances of the
taking make the taking suspicious, courts should apply a less
deferential scope of review ("There may be private transfers in
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private
parties is so acute that a presumption [rebuttable or otherwise] of
invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause").12 1 But
Justice Kennedy too narrowly applied the closer scrutiny rule he
proposed. All takings of private property where the taken land is
planned to ultimately be deeded to private persons or entities for a
"non-traditional" purpose (whether for economic development, to
1 22
build a hotel, or even to clear an area considered to be a "slum")
should be considered to have a higher potential for "impermissible
favoritism" and abuse of power, which, consequently, should
trigger a more demanding level of judicial scrutiny of the taking.
Justice Kennedy was also correct when he identified several
factors that made the takings in the Kelo case less suspicious.
Among the key facts Justice Kennedy cited to were that the
specific takings challenged were part of a comprehensive plan
meant to address a substantial public issue (the economic
depression in the city) in which most of the private parties who
would end up owning the taken properties were not initially
identified. Consequently, these are the sort of matters that a court
should be more closely scrutinizing in the context of any taking
where the taken property is being deeded to private entities for
non-traditional purposes.
Indeed, there is Supreme Court precedent in the takings area
for a higher level of scrutiny when due to the context of the
governmental action there is a higher likelihood of abuse of
process. The Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission rejected scrutinizing a specific governmental action
on the basis of whether the action was merely rational, and
instead, required a showing by the government that the
requirement of an easement (in return for a permit to build a
larger residence on ocean front property) bore an essential nexus
to the alleged police power objective of the imposition."'2 The Court
cited to Penn Central'24 for the rule that a regulation that abridges
property rights must "substantially" advance a legitimate state
interest and then stated:

121. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670.
122. See infra Part VII. If, however, the transfer is to a private entity, in
order for that entity to provide a service to the general public a forced sale is
necessary to assemble the necessary land (as is the case with eminent domain

for railroad tracks or utility lines), and should be considered a "traditional"
taking, even though deeded to a private entity. Id.
123. 483 U.S. at 837 (1987).
124. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:609

We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where
the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting
of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is heightened
risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement,
rather than the stated police-power objective.125
Thus, Nollan stands for the proposition that courts should more
closely scrutinize governmental actions, and require a higher
burden for the government to meet when the governmental action
affects property rights in circumstances where the governmental
action is likely to be abused. While the heightened risk in the
Nollan case was the situation of an exaction imposed as a
condition to obtaining a building permit, one could argue that
another example of a potential heightened risk is in the context of
a private-to-private taking for a non-traditional purpose, which
should also cause a heightened judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court went even further in a later case'26 than
requiring an essential nexus in the context of exactions imposed as
a condition to obtaining a building permit, but concluded that they
had not needed to do so in Nollan because the government had
failed in that case to even meet the essential nexus test. In
Nollan, the governmental entity argued that the reason for
requiring the public easement across Nollan's beach was that by
increasing the size of the home on their property they were
creating a psychological barrier to the public, preventing them
from knowing there was a public beach just north and south of
their property. 127 The court questioned if this was the real motive
for the forced dedication and ruled that there was not an essential
connection between the exaction and the alleged purpose for the
exaction:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans'
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any
"psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to
remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of
the Nollans' new house. 128
The court concluded that the real motive for the easement
requirement was the California Coastal Commission's desire to
create a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the
coast, which in fact might be in the public interest and a
permissible goal, but not when imposed as a condition for
obtaining a building permit.129
125. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
126. 512 U.S. 374.
127. 483 U.S. 825, 835.
128. Id. at 839.

129. Id. at 841-42.
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Seven years later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court again
addressed the higher level of scrutiny that courts should apply to a
governmental action that affected property rights in the
"heightened risk" context of an exaction required for a building
permit.3 ' In Dolan, the property owner desired to approximately
double the size of her hardware store and increase the size of her
parking lot.13' The city was concerned with the impact her
proposed changes would have on traffic and flooding (her property
was located in a 100 hundred year floodplain and increasing the
size of the parking lot would increase the amount of impervious
surface area).'32 The city therefore required that she dedicate a
portion of her land for a bicycle and pedestrian path and also
required that she dedicate a portion of her land as a public
greenway. 1u The Court ruled that there was an essential nexus
between the increased size of the store, the increased traffic this
would cause, and the imposition required of a bicycle and
pedestrian path. However, the Court stated that this would not be
the end of the analysis. The Court ruled that due to the context of
this governmental regulation (that it was more adjudicatory in
nature than legislative and that the city conditioned the permit
not on a limitation of use but a deeding of a portion of the
property) it was appropriate to apply a higher level of judicial
scrutiny than it would apply in a more legislative type
governmental regulation as exemplified in the Euclid,'
Pennsylvania Coal Co., ' or Agins'36 cases.'
In responding to
Justice Steven's dissent criticizing the higher level of judicial
scrutiny the majority of the Court was imposing, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority stated:
He is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally applicable
zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party
challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary
regulation of property rights .... Here by contrast, the city made
an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a
building permit on an individual
parcel. In this situation, the
138
burden properly rests on the city.
In applying the higher level of scrutiny to the bicycle and
pedestrian easement, the Court stated that although the city
estimated that the proposed development would generate roughly

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 380.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-261 (1980).
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90.
Id. at 391 n.8.
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435 additional trips per day,
on the record before us, the city has not met its burden of
demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle
trips generated by petitioner's development reasonably relate to the
city's requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway
easement. The city simply found that the creation of the pathway
"could" offset some of the traffic demand and lessen the increase in
traffic congestion. 139
In ultimately concluding that these findings were not
constitutionally sufficient, the Court stated: "No precise
mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that
it could offset some of the traffic demand generated."4 ' Quoting
with approval from the dissenting justice of the Oregon Supreme
Court with respect to this case, the Court emphasized that a
finding that the easement "could" offset some of the traffic demand
"is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway
system will or
41
is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand."
The Nollan and Dolan cases provide recent Supreme Court
precedent for courts to more closely scrutinize governmental
actions affecting private property when the governmental action is
taken in a context where there is a heightened risk of abuse. In
those cases the heightened risk was due to the exaction context;
but when the government uses its taking power in a manner
intended for the property to end up in the hands of another private
property owner, this should also be considered a context with a
heightened risk for abuse, equally deserving closer judicial
scrutiny to ensure the government is not asserting public benefits
that are a mere pretext or too speculative in nature.
As previously discussed, Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in
Kelo, tried to prevent legislative abuse of the taking power by
interpreting "public use" to mean either a literal public use or a
prevention of harm."2 However, this judicial interpretation of
public use is problematic for three reasons. First, it is based on a
reading of the Berman case that only slum properties can be
condemned for development by a private entity (i.e., the
prevention of harm situation), but in Berman some of the land so
taken was in fact not in poor condition but in the vicinity of such
properties.
Second, oftentimes, a given project could be
characterized either as promoting the general welfare or as
preventing a public harm, making the distinction not a solid basis

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 387, 395.
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at 394.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.
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for distinguishing permissible from impermissible takings.'
Finally, simply applying a literal interpretation of public use is
unwise because it is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is
over-inclusive because it would prevent some traditional or
otherwise important public benefit type takings, such as the use of
eminent domain to lay utility lines. It is also under-inclusive
because even a literal public use - where the public has the right
to use of the property taken - could serve as a pretext for a taking
really designed to benefit a private party.'"

143. Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The
Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 33 (1987). Large states:
[The] test is hard to apply to a wide range of borderline cases. If the
state wants someone's land for an affirmative benefit (a new post office,
a highway, or a dam and reservoir), there is a new public benefit and the
state must pay for the land taken. This is just the old physical invasion
standard; in such a case, the land taken must be paid for even if the
landowner retains valuable adjoining land... [for example] how is [the]
The
benefit distinguished from detriment in preservation cases? ...
state could be securing a benefit for the public (access to an unspoiled
coast or shoreline) or the state could merely be preventing a detriment
(by prohibiting the landowner from destroying fish breeding grounds or
causing increased flooding). A concept this slippery may not be very
useful ....
When Ernst Freund first coined the phrase in the late
nineteenth century, the benefit/detriment concept may have been
workable because local governments were doing easily classifiable
things, like building public works and stopping public nuisances. The
concept simply does not mesh as well with broad, preservation-oriented
laws and is subject to wide-ranging abuse by aggressive local
governments.
Id.; see also David A. Dana, Natural Preservationand the Race to Develop, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 655, 660 (1995). Dana states that,
[o]utside of a relatively narrow set of cases, however, there is likely to be
a lack of consensus as to whether a restricted activity would be
"harmful" to the public. The judicial opinions offer no guidance as to
how to distinguish between public harm and public benefit in such
cases.
Conclusory assertions, presumably reflecting the courts'
normative assessments of the activity at issue and its likely societal
effects, are all that are offered.
Id.; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992)
(declaring that the comparison is subjective, specifically that "the distinction
between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the
eye of the beholder"). Furthermore, the test is ridiculous because any
explanation can be rationalized by the courts to give a positive takings result,
thus "[s]ince such a justification can be formulated in practically every case,
this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.... [Tihe
Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon artful harmpreventing characterizations." Id. at 1025.
144. See supra Part II.
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RESTORING THE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES THROUGH A
CATEGORY BASED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE
PUBLIC USE DETERMINATION

In order to restore our constitutional system of checks and
balances regarding the eminent domain power, 45' the Supreme
Court should acknowledge that the Court's dicta of extreme
judicial deference towards legislative judgments of public use in
the Berman and Midkiff cases in the context of "non-traditional"
takings (defined below) was in error and no longer applies. The
precise level of heightened scrutiny courts need to engage in
should be based upon the context of the specific taking and the
resulting potential for abuse of process, and potential degree of
harm to property rights from such taking associated with each
context. This article proposes three categories of takings and a
specific level of appropriate judicial review for each category, with
an eye towards balancing the legislative branch's traditional
power to enact laws that promote the general welfare with the
court's traditional role of invalidating legislation that constitutes
an abuse of process or that unduly infringes upon "fundamental"
rights.
The first category is a "traditional" taking situation. This
category is defined as the taking of land in order to create an
improvement that is owned by the government (like the White
House), or open to the public as a matter of right (like a public
park), or to assemble the necessary land in order for a highly
regulated private entity to provide a service to the general public
(such as a railroad or utility company). The level of judicial review
for a traditional category one taking would be the most deferential
of the three categories, with the government enjoying an initial
presumption that the taking is for a public use because either
there is a literal public use (i.e., the government would own the
taken land or the land would be open to the public as a matter of
right) or there is a necessary taking for a purpose that directly
benefits the public generally (i.e., land assemblage necessary to
operate a railroad or utilities). When the taking occurs in this
traditional context, an abuse of process, where the taking is not
really designed to benefit the public, but instead to confer a special
benefit to a private party, is unlikely to arise. Although part of the
traditional taking category includes possible transfers to private
parties where the end use is not open to the public as a matter of
right, when the private party is providing a service to the general
public and is highly regulated, these two conditions assist in

145. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). Such an
admission of error would be similar to its acknowledgment of error in Lingle
regarding application of the dicta "substantially advance a legitimate state

interest" in the context of a regulatory taking. Id.
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4
linking the taking to a public benefit."'
In addition, due to the
problematic land assemblage issue (and holdout problem) inherent
in a taking of long stretches of land for utilities or a railroad line,
the taking becomes more of a necessity, justifying legislative
action to compel the sale. 147
Notwithstanding the inherent safeguards in a category one
taking, there is still the possibility of abuse of process even for this
type of taking, and, consequently, courts should engage, with
respect to this category of taking, in a robust review of any
evidence that the taking was a pretext for another purpose, was in
bad faith, or that it failed to comply with due process procedural
requirements such as notice and a hearing. 48 If such evidence is
presented by the party challenging the taking, the government
would have to rebut this evidence or the court should invalidate
the taking. Unfortunately, even though there is a long line of
Supreme Court cases stating that courts should invalidate a
taking that is not really for a public benefit because the asserted
benefit is a pretext, 4 ' the dicta in Kelo that all the government
must show is a "conceivable" public benefit can undermine a
property owner's ability to show that the public benefit is so
speculative that the alleged public benefit is a pretext and abuse of
process.

146. See Olga V. Kotlyarevskaya, "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent
Domain Cases Based on Slum Clearance, Elimination of Urban Blight, and
Economic Development, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 222 (2006) (declaring that
takings where title is deeded to a utility company or railroad company, which
are heavily regulated industries, provide a safeguard that the public purpose
of the taking will continue to be served after the sale to the private entity
occurs).
147. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986). Merrill argues that such land assemblage takings
arise in what he calls "thin markets" where voluntary negotiations are likely
to be unsuccessful and where governmental action under the Fifth
Amendment power is appropriate. Id. at 65. Merrill identifies four other
situations that create a "thin market": expansion of an existing facility,
landlocked property, where unique property is needed, or where specific
capital has already been invested in the property, but since these do not
necessarily involve uses that generally benefit the public, as utilities and
railroad lines do, they are not included in this proposal as a category one
traditional taking. Id. at 98-100.
148. The requirement of notice and a hearing can provide a measure of
transparency to the process, especially if a public hearing takes place when a
large number of property owners land is proposed to be taken, which can help
to safeguard against improper takings. See also John Fee, Eminent Domain
and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 801-02 (2006)
(proposing that at the hearing the governmental agency proposing the taking
would have to report on the displacement effect from the taking, would accept
and respond to public comments prior to the taking, and would present
findings that no feasible alternatives exist prior to the taking).
149. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
150. The idea that the government need only show a conceivable public
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Some state courts are already engaged in this kind of vigorous
review and have invalidated takings on evidence that the alleged
public benefit was a pretext, based upon the highly speculative
nature of the asserted public benefit or other evidence of bad faith.
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a proposed
taking to allow a racetrack to expand its parking lot by looking at
the motive and effects of the taking. 5 ' The court in Southwestern
Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental,
LLC, noted that the development authority authorized by a state
statute to engage in condemnations for economic development
(SWIDA) had failed to conduct a thorough study regarding the
parking situation and its economic impact for the region, but
instead had simply responded to the desires of a business owner.'5 2
"[I]t is incumbent upon us to question SWIDA's findings as to the
parking situation at Gateway and determine whether the true
beneficiaries of this taking are private beneficiaries and not the
public. " "l The court also noted that Gateway sought to expand its
parking through a forced sale of the neighbor's property rather
than build a parking garage structure on its existing property
since the forced expansion would allow Gateway to achieve its
goals more swiftly and profitably."
Although the court
acknowledged that the expansion of parking, which was estimated
to lead to an expansion of revenue between thirteen and fourteen
million dollars per year, "could potentially trickle down and bring
corresponding revenue increases to the region," the court ruled
that "revenue expansion alone does not justify an improper and
unacceptable expansion of the eminent domain power of the
government.., for purely private purposes."155 Indeed, according
to the court, SWIDA would advertise that it would condemn land
for a fee at the request of private property owners, rather than
initiate a taking based upon SWIDA's own study of the economic
needs of a region. 5 6
A second, famous, example of a state court invalidating a
proposed taking based upon abuse of process is Casino
Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin57 In this case, the

benefit probably comes from the line of cases relating to ordinary police power
type regulations affecting economic and business interests where the lax
rational relation to a legitimate interest test applies. This test, especially the
"conceivable" language part, is incompatible with the Court's role in ensuring
that the "public use" requirement in the Constitution is safeguarded.
151. Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1
(Ill. 2002).
152. Id. at 11.
153. Id. at 10.
154. Id. at 10-11.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 11.
157. 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998).
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abuse of process was based on the fact that the alleged public
benefit (the need for a parking structure in the area) from the
taking was a pretext and not the real purpose of the taking (to
benefit Donald Trump). The court was particularly concerned by
the fact that none of the development agreements that Trump
entered into required him to maintain the parking facility for a
specific period of time, making the asserted public benefit
"illusory" and the claimed public benefit a "pretext." " For the
court, based on prior precedent, "The controlling question [wa]s
whether the paramount reason for taking land is in the public
interest," and "[where... a condemnation is commenced for an
apparently valid pubic purpose, but the real purpose is otherwise,
the condemnation may be set aside." 59 In determining the real
purpose of a taking, the court ruled that one should assess the
consequences and effects of a proposed taking: "If the
consequences and effects of condemning... are simply to allow for
the acquisition and assemblage of land by Trump for future
private development purposes then the asserted public benefits
are illusory." 6 '
In a third case, City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments,
Inc., the court struck down a proposed taking for a baseball
stadium for two reasons: the lack of standards in place to
safeguard the public purposes for the taking and evidence that the
city, and its mayor, had acted in bad faith."16 The court noted that
under the terms of the lease of the stadium there was a potential
for a windfall to the developer since the lease did not prohibit the
private developer from assigning the lease to persons operating
the team for profit and failed to provide for any money to be paid
to the city that paid for the stadium.6 2 The court also noted that
there were misrepresentations in the grant applications for public
funds to benefit a private non-profit corporation and no statement
The court also closely
of purpose in the order for the taking."
scrutinized the actions of the mayor and concluded that, over time,
the mayor's actions ceased to be directed towards a public
benefit. "
When courts closely scrutinize evidence of pretext and abuse
of process, this does not constitute improper "second guessing" of
legislative judgments. Instead, this type of review restores the

158.
159.
160.
161.
0014,
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 103, 105.
Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
Id. at 105 (citation omitted).
City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments, Inc., 1999-1318, 99-1230, 002000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 131 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000).
Id. at *125.
Id. at* 145.
Id. at *141-42.
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system of checks and balances between the branches of
government essential to the American constitutional system.
Conversely, when courts follow the errant language on judicial
deference used in the Berman and Midkiff cases and fail to closely
scrutinize whether the alleged public benefit is a pretext (based
upon evidence of bad faith, abuse of process, or a highly
speculative public benefit) this system of checks and balances is
lost.
In a category two taking, unlike a traditional taking, the
government plans that the property taken will be owned by a
private person or entity that is not heavily regulated as to its use
of the property (and there might not be a land assemblage reason
to force a sale), but where it is alleged the taking will create an
indirect benefit to the general public (such as a taking for the
purpose of achieving urban renewal/economic development). In
this setting, the issue of public benefit is less clear than in a
traditional category one taking, and the potential for abuse of
process far higher. Consequently, the scope of judicial review for a
category two taking should be higher than for a category one
taking.
First, the government should be required to show that the
taking of the property is "necessary" and that there are no other
reasonable alternative ways to achieve the indirect pubic benefit
asserted than through the exercise of the takings power. Indeed,
requiring the government to show how this taking is necessary is
in essence turning the category two taking into one that more
resembles a category one taking where traditionally such a
necessity does exist, and served as the basis for the historical use
of the takings clause in those situations. When James Madison
drafted the Fifth Amendment, the clause originally required not
only a public use and just compensation, but also that the taking
be "necessary."'65
Second, the burden of proof should be on the government to
also provide evidence that the asserted public benefit for the
taking is "likely to occur" rather than speculative in order to better
satisfy the public benefit requirement. If the asserted public
benefit is not likely to occur, then it is more likely that the taking
is a pretext and abuse of process where a private party is benefited
by the taking rather than the public.
One key factor in
determining whether the asserted public benefit is likely to occur
is whether the new contemplated use by the private party is
165. See, e.g., Handley v. Cook, 252 S.E.2d 147, 153 (W. Va. 1979) (stating
the ideas of "just compensation" and fair use were contemplated by James
Madison, but that these ideas are traceable back to the equitable judicial
policies of the Roman Empire in the second century B.C and the Napoleonic
Code).
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required to continue for a specified period after the taking occurs.
Several state courts have adopted this line of inquiry when
determining if an indirect public benefit satisfies the "public use"
requirement." In addition, picking up on the dicta in the majority
and concurring opinions in Kelo, and expanding upon it as the
court did in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, the
governmental agency should be required to conduct a thorough
study of the proposed economic impact from the project, and the
study should provide concrete evidence that the asserted public
benefit is not only "conceivable" (a major flaw with the holding in
Kelo), but instead is "likely to occur." As previously discussed, the
Supreme Court in Dolan has already required the government in
the context of imposing an exaction to first engage in studies that
provide evidence that the alleged benefit from the exaction "will or
is likely" to occur rather than "might" occur. The government
should be similarly required to provide evidence that the alleged
public benefit in the context of a category two taking will or is
likely to occur.'67
When the government attempts to forcibly take a person's
dwelling in either a category one or category two taking, such
taking will need to be subject to an even higher level of judicial
review and converted to a category three taking. This is because
more is lost than income when a home is taken. A person's
interest in her home, especially a home lived in for many years, is
inextricably linked to the person's identity, community, emotional
well being, security, and educational opportunities." Due to the
more fundamental nature of an ownership interest in a home as
contrasted with ownership of other types of real property, 69 and
the fact that homeowners sometimes experience profound
subjective value in their homes that are not currently
compensated for under the "just compensation" clause, 7 ' the
166. See, e.g., Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782 (Mich. 2004) (the
second category of permitted taking is one where a private entity remains
accountable to the public to ensure that the asserted public benefit from the
taking continues after the transfer of ownership through a mechanism in place
to keep the uses desired in place); Springfield v. Dreison Investments, Inc.,
Nos. 19991318, 991230, 000014, 2000 WL 782971 (Mass Super. Ct., Feb. 25,
2000) (land taken for baseball stadium deemed not to be primarily for public
benefit in part because there were no safeguards in place to ensure how the
taken land would actually be used after the taking).
167. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
168. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255 (2006) (stating a home is not fungible and has been treated with special
protections in the U.S. Constitution regarding search and seizure laws, and by
state legislation regarding homestead laws, and city rent control ordinances).
169. Id.
170. Fee, supra note 148, at 794 (proposing that compensation for a
homeowner's "reasonable" subjective value in her home should be a formula
based upon objective fair market value plus two percent for each year of
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government should be required to show, even in the context of a
taking to create a literal public use, that the taking of this
property is necessary and that there are no other reasonable

alternative properties that are non-dwellings that could be taken
in its place. This necessity test is similar to the necessity test
proposed for category two takings. Similar to the category two
taking, in a category three taking, the burden of proof should be on
the government to also provide evidence that the asserted public
benefit for the taking is likely to occur rather than speculative.
The third and key additional requirement for a category three
taking is that the government must show that an "important"
public benefit is being served with this taking of a person's home,
which can be measured by whether there is a "net social benefit"
from the taking. This requirement, that the governmental action
be for an important public benefit, imposes a level of scrutiny
somewhat less than the strict scrutiny courts apply when a law
infringes upon a fundamental right such as freedom of expression
(which would require the government to show a compelling public
interest that is being achieved in a manner least restrictive to the
fundamental right), but is greater than the minimal "rational
relation to a legitimate interest" test that courts generally apply to
regulations that merely impact economic and business interests.
Since a category three taking impacts a person's rights
relating to their home, which involve not only purely economic
interests but many other important fundamental interests, and is
likely to result in the homeowner experiencing large,
uncompensated losses,17' it is inappropriate for courts to apply the
minimal level of judicial review in this context. Indeed, Congress
expressly recognized that certain property rights involve more
than economic or business interests when it enacted the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and courts in
response to this legislation have required a strict level of scrutiny
when the government attempts to exercise the eminent domain
powers as against a house of religious worship.172 On the other
hand, because of the wording of the Fifth Amendment, which
provides an express mechanism for the government to in fact force
a sale of property, the level of judicial scrutiny (absent legislation
requiring more) should generally not be at the same high level as
with a governmental law that impacts upon a right guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights and under wording that is more absolute
in its description of the right being guaranteed as the wording
ownership of the home).
171. See supra Part VI.
172. Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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under the First Amendment. 7 '

Thus, the test proposed for a

category three taking is similar to the intermediate level of
scrutiny test that courts apply in connection with sex based
discrimination where the government must show that the law
drawing a distinction based on sex serves an "important
governmental objective" and is "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."174
In addition, if it can be shown that the takings for a specific
project have a disproportionate impact upon a protected minority
(such as African-Americans), then based upon the equal protection
analysis courts currently apply to such a disproportionate impact
in other contexts, the court must apply a strict scrutiny of the
taking and determine whether there is a racially neutral
explanation for this disproportionate impact, and if not, the
proposed taking should be invalidated unless the government can
show a compelling public benefit from the taking that can only be
achieved through the taking of the minority owned property.171
Because a taking of a homeowner's home impacts upon an
even more fundamental right than that of an economic interest in
property, and because of the likelihood of substantial
uncompensated losses due to current interpretations of the "just
compensation" requirement, courts should invalidate a category
three taking unless it can be shown that an important public
benefit is achieved through the taking, measured in terms of
whether there is a "net social benefit" from the taking. A net
social benefit would be a public benefit large enough to outweigh
the total losses of the parties directly affected by the taking, which
would include not only the fair market value of the land taken as
currently measured, but also would include: (1) the cost of
comparable replacement land and improvements on the land
173. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
174. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
175. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 254, 265
(1977). In Arlington Heights the Court stated that a racially disproportionate
impact of a zoning ordinance is not sufficient to show discriminatory intent,

but also stated:
[Wlhether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor

demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action
whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another"... may
provide an important starting point.

Sometimes a clear pattern,

unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the
state action even when the governing legislation appears nuetral on its
face.
Id. at 266 (internal citations omitted).
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taken to the extent they exceed the fair market value of the land
taken (this addresses the problem of destroying affordable housing
without accounting for the costs of replacing such affordable
housing); (2) relocation costs (including not only moving costs but
also related termination and start-up costs for utilities)'76 ; and (3)
loss of "reasonable subjective value."'77
Since subjective value includes the emotional attachment a
person develops towards the place where she has lived, how can
one measure this emotional attachment and verify its
authenticity? How can one recover for "reasonable" subjective
value? John Fee, in Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home,
argues that it is important for courts to consider the subjective
value a person places on her home when calculating "just
compensation," and then, in trying to solve the enigma of how to
measure "reasonable" subjective value, proposes a formula that
would increase the compensation provided based on the number of
Fee proposes an
years that a person resides in her home.
that
a
person resides in
each
year
adjustment of two percent for
her home (the idea being that it is reasonable to presume that the
longer a person has lived in a home the deeper her emotional
attachment and the greater her subjective value) with a cap of a
forty percent increase in compensation. This type of formula could
be a sensible way for courts to include in the net social benefit
calculus some element of the minimum subjective value a person
places on a home about to be lost in a forced sale over the fair
market value of the home.
A fourth real loss that persons suffer when they are forced by
the government to abandon their homes, especially when they
have lived in this home for many years and the homeowners
disagree with the new use of their home, is referred to as
"demoralization costs." 7 ' These losses, however, can be difficult to
79
measure and verify and can create high transaction costs.'

176. James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on
Eminent Domain, 69 MINN L. REV. 1277, 1305 (1984-1985) (stating these two
additional costs and identifying loss of current business revenue and loss of
business goodwill or value as well, but these do not typically apply to a
homeowner).
177. Fee, supra note 148.
178. Durham, supra note 176, at 1303 (1984-1985) (citing Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214
(1967)); Thomas Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of
Eminent Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355, 377 & nn.89-90 (1983).
179. Durham, supra note 176, at 1308 (1984-1985) (arguing these costs can
be measured in a similar fashion to the tort of emotional distress and that
when the demoralization costs are large and quantifiable, and do not pose high
transactions costs, they should be included as part of "just compensation").
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Perhaps a formula could be created to more easily measure these
costs as with the "reasonable subjective value" formula. This
component could also then be included when calculating a net
social benefit from the category three taking.
Finally, because quantifying the "benefit" from the taking is
more difficult to do in a traditional taking as contrasted with a
category two (typically economic development taking), this
proposal would not require the government to attempt to quantify
the benefit in a traditional category one taking even when the
target of the taking is a person's home. However, the government
would still have to pay the full losses to the homeowners (i.e., not
just fair market value, but also the other three components
previously discussed, including reasonable subjective value) when
the otherwise traditional taking involves a forced sale of a person's
home. In a taking of a person's home to achieve an "economic
development" type goal (what would otherwise be a category two
taking), the government should be required to not only pay the
higher just compensation, but also prove that the alleged public
benefits from the taking (whether in the form of increased taxes,
lower crime rates, or other positive impacts from the taking)' will
exceed the losses to the homeowners whose homes have been
forcibly taken.
VII. CONCLUSION
The common perception of the Kelo case, that the government
can now take any property under the Fifth Amendment if they
simply allege or show that the new use of the property will achieve
a higher economic use, or that no real public benefit need exist, is
a misreading of the majority and concurring opinions. Justice
Stevens in the majority opinion emphasized the importance that
180. See Nancy Kubasek & Garrett Coyle, A Step Backward is Not
Necessarily a Step in the Wrong Direction, 30 VT. L. REv. 43, 64, 69-70 (2005).

Kubasek and Garrett argue:
Employment effects can be counted in the public benefit only to the
extent that they lead to public benefits: lower crime rates, increased tax
revenue, etc. [and] [iln order to check legislative power, the burden
ought to rest instead on the government to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, three facts: 1) that the taking is necessary for the
achievement of the purported public purpose; 2) that if the taking were
to occur, the materialization of the public benefits they allege is more
likely to occur than not; and 3) that the taking is not more extensive
than necessary to serve the alleged public purpose.
Id. at 64, 69-70. The authors also recommended that to ensure the alleged
public benefits take place a provision be added in the taking documentation
that if the private entities promised benefits do not materialize (such as a
certain number of new jobs) within a specified period, the city may assess the
entity a predetermined fee each year the asserted benefits do not take place.
Id. at 70.
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the private-to-private taking be done in the context of an
integrated development plan (as contrasted with an isolated
improvement of economic position),' that the government must
provide a reasoned explanation for the taking,' and that courts
should closely scrutinize whether the alleged public use is a
pretext for what is in essence the conferring of a private benefit. ",3
Justice Kennedy, in the concurring opinion (which was necessary
for Justice Stevens' opinion to become the majority opinion), also
emphasized the court's role in scrutinizing the facts to ensure that
the alleged public benefit is not a pretext and not de minimus, but
instead for an important public purpose." One of the factors that
Justice Kennedy pointed to as a basis to uphold the validity of the
taking was that the integrated plan was intended to address a
serious city-wide depression."u Justice Kennedy also emphasized
that courts should scrutinize the adequacy of the procedures the
government uses when exercising its Fifth Amendment powers to
ensure that the procedures facilitate review of the record and
inquiry into the city's purposes."8
Yet, the Kelo decision is still very troubling for the dicta in the
majority, concurring, and even Justice O'Connor's dissenting
opinion that judges should show extreme deference to a legislative
judgment of public use and not to "second guess" legislative
judgments, even in the context of a non-traditional taking.'87 Both
the majority and O'Connor in her dissent in Kelo felt bound to
apply the extreme judicial deference standard articulated in two
Supreme Court cases, Berman and Midkiff, that courts must
accept a legislative judgment that a particular taking will benefit
the public (or prevent a harm to the public), and that the
government need only show that such public benefit (or prevention
of harm) could conceivably occur. But, as Part III of this article
demonstrates, none of the cases cited to by the Court in Berman
and Midkiff provide support for this extreme judicial deference in
the context of a non-traditional taking. Consequently, the Court is
in a very strong position to reexamine the continued applicability
of this deferential approach in the context of non-traditional
takings similar to the Court's reexamination of the "substantially
advances a legitimate state interest" dicta in the Lingle decision.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
Id. at 2667.
Id.; see also supra note 28.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2670-71.
Id.
Id. at 2864-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Of course, Justice O'Connor's

opinion took the position that public use does not generally mean public
benefit, but instead a literal public use, plus a prevention of a public harm,
like slum clearance - but as to these categories, she would apply a deferential
approach. Id.
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In addition, when courts closely scrutinize evidence of pretext, bad
faith, abuse of process, or a highly speculative public benefit, this
does not constitute "second guessing" of legislative judgments.
Instead this type of review restores the system of checks and
balances between the branches of government that are essential to
the American Constitutional system.
Indeed, a closer examination of the facts in the Midkiff case
exemplifies the need for closer judicial scrutiny of the alleged
public benefit in a private-to-private transfer to prevent abuses of
process (i.e., takings where the alleged public benefit is a mere
pretext or illusory) and to restore the judiciary's legitimate role
under the Constitutional system of checks and balances. A closer
review of the facts in Midkiff reveals that, as amended, the Land
Reform Act actually benefited wealthy non-native Hawaiians (the
tenants who in fact used the Act to force a sale of land to them) at
the expense of native Hawaiian children who were the
beneficiaries of the Bishop Estate's trust and beneficial owner of
the land forcibly taken. The asserted public benefits from the
forced transfer of land (to prevent an alleged shortage of fee simple
title to land - one of the evils of oligopoly - causing inflated land
prices) did not exist in reality; instead, it was the rent control laws
that provided effective land reform to lower income tenants who
were having difficulty paying the new rents on long-term leases
that were being renewed at the new market rates."S Ironically, a
closer look at the facts in Midkiff would have caused the court to
conclude that the Land Reform Act as amended and utilized did
more to harm rather than benefit the public.
Trying to prevent abusive exercises of the eminent domain
power (i.e., exercises that benefit private persons or entities rather
than the public) by narrowly interpreting public use to mean a
literal public use, as Justice Thomas argued for in his dissent, or
to combine with this a prevention of harm requirement (as Justice
O'Connor supported) are not the best approaches because such
approaches are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. They are
over-inclusive because they would prevent some traditional or
otherwise important public benefit type takings, such as the use of
eminent domain to lay utility lines. They are under-inclusive
because even a literal public use situation or allegation of a
prevention of a public harm could be a pretext for a taking that is
really designed to benefit a private party. In addition, many
governmental actions (such as creating restrictions
on
modifications of landmarks) can be articulated either as a
promotion of a good (promoting tourism, preserving aesthetic and
historic values) or prevention of a harm (preventing a loss of
tourism, preventing the destruction of aesthetic and historic
188. See supra Part IV.
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values).'89 Consequently, it is not sensible to apply a distinction on
the basis of preventing a public harm versus promoting a public
benefit as a basis to evaluate whether the governmental action
constitutes a public use or not.
So, what level of judicial scrutiny is constitutionally
appropriate for evaluating various types of takings? One guiding
principle that currently enjoys recent constitutional support is
that courts should more closely scrutinize those takings that are
more susceptible to abuse of process. The Court in Nollan and
Dolan provides precedent for applying a closer scrutiny of
governmental actions when such actions are done in a context that
is more susceptible to abuse of process."9 The Court in Dolan
required that the city not only allege that the exaction required in
that case for a building permit might alleviate the alleged harm
from the expansion of the store and parking area, but that the city
quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway and show how the easement not only
could offset the increased traffic demand but show how it will or is
likely to offset the added traffic demand.'
Just as imposition of
an exaction as a condition to the granting of a building permit is
more susceptible to abuse of process than a comprehensive zoning
ordinance, so a private-to-private forced transfer of title for a nontraditional purpose (such as economic development) is more
susceptible to abuse of process than a traditional exercise of
eminent domain for a public road.
Rather than interpret public use to exclude all such nontraditional exercises of eminent domain, this Article argues that
an approach that better comports with the legitimate functions of
the legislative and judicial branches is for courts to more closely
scrutinize these takings with different levels of scrutiny depending
upon the circumstances of the taking. The Article articulates
three categories of takings and appropriate levels of judicial
review and legislative burdens for each category.'92
Under a category one taking (a traditional taking where the
government will own the land taken, the land taken will be open
to the public as a matter of right, or certain specialized traditional
takings), 93 it will be presumed that the taking satisfies the public
use requirement, but the presumption can be rebutted by evidence
of bad faith, abuse of process or pretext, in the fashion described in
the SWIDA or the Trump cases,9 and the courts should engage in
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra Part V.
supra Part V.
supra Part V.
supra Part VI.
supra pp. 644-48 (discussing these "specialized" takings).
supra pp. 646-47 (discussing the SWIDA and the Trump cases).
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a robust review of any evidence of this presented by the party
challenging the taking.
Under a category two taking (a non-traditional taking where
a private party will own the land taken), since there is more
potential for abuse of process, the government has the burden to
prove with substantial evidence that the pubic benefit is likely to
occur and that the taking is reasonably necessary to achieve the
public benefit (i.e., that there are no other reasonable alternatives
to accomplishing this objective).
A category three taking (either a category one or category two
taking, but where the land taken is the property owner's home)
would be treated at an even higher level of scrutiny than a
category two taking because when a person loses her home, the
nature of the property interest lost is often more fundamental
than the pure economic loss typically suffered when other property
is taken, and because in this context the uncompensated subjective
value lost can be very high. A person's interest in her home,
especially if lived in for many years, is inextricably linked to the
person's identity, community, emotional well being, security, and
educational opportunities, and is thus more fundamental in nature
than other property interests.
Consequently, under a category three taking, the government
must demonstrate that an important public benefit is being served
through the taking of a person's home, determined based upon the
government providing evidence that there is a "net social benefit"
from the taking. To satisfy the net social benefit requirement, the
government would have to present evidence in a non-traditional
category two type taking of the public benefit and that such public
benefit would exceed the losses of the property owner losing her
home, applying a more expansive and inclusive measure of those
losses than current case law interpretations of "just compensation"
would require. The added damages would include: (1) the cost of
comparable replacement land and improvements on the land
taken to the extent they exceed the fair market value of the land
taken (to address the problem of destroying affordable housing
without accounting for the costs of replacing such affordable
housing); (2) relocation costs (including not only moving costs, but
also related termination and start-up costs for utilities); and (3)
the loss of "reasonable subjective value" of the land taken
(measured with a formula based upon the number of years of
ownership and residence in the home).
In the event, however, that a category one type taking of a
person's home is involved, the government will not need to
quantify the public benefit since it is more difficult to quantify the
public benefit in this context and because it is a taking which is
less likely to be abused. However, the government would still be
required to pay to the property owner who is losing her home the
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expanded measure of her losses to ensure that the government is

exercising the eminent domain powers in an efficient and fair
5
fashion. 19
Although Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented in Kelo, they still adopted the problematic judicial
deferential dicta from the Berman and Midkiff cases. With the
addition of two new justices since the Kelo decision, it is hoped
that the Court will re-examine the continued validity of this
approach and will consider instead the three category model
described in this Article as the better means to restore the proper
balance between the functions of the legislative and judicial
branches in terms of allowing the government to exercise its
eminent domain powers in a broad fashion for the public benefit,
while at the same time better protecting property owners, and in
particular homeowners, from abuses of process.

195. Kubasek & Coyle, supra note 180, at 62-65. When the government is
able to pay a property owner less than she really values her property and less
than her total losses from the forced sale, it is not only unfair to the property
owner because she is not made whole, but inefficient since it leads to
"distortions of market forces" since the private entity was not willing to pay
and not required to pay the landowner the landowner's full valuation of the
property. Id.

